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The Employment Regimes of Industrial Districts:       
Promises, Myths, and Realities** 
The industrial district model views socially and regionally integrated economic 
relations as the basis for competitive and viable regional economies. The "socially 
embedded" organization of production in industrial districts is said to have 
emancipatory effects for labor and regional economies. This paper challenges this 
view. Recent developments of inter-firm relations in industrial districts in the "Third 
Italy" and Baden-Württemberg, the "model cases" in the district literature, reveal a 
number of tensions and contradictions, with precarious outcomes for labor and 
employment. Contradictions between local needs and global forces, business 
flexibility and employment security, risk sharing and risk shifting, and business 
efficiency and employment equity raise doubts about industrial districts as a model 
for "labor friendly" regional economic development. 
Das Modell des industriellen Distrikt betrachtet die soziale Integration 
wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen in die regionale Gemeinschaft als Basis für die 
Wettbewerbs- und Überlebensfähigkeit des Distrikts als Produktionsorganisation. 
Aus dieser "sozialen Einbettung" werden gewöhnlich emanzipatorische 
Auswirkungen für Arbeiternehmer und Regionalwirtschaft abgeleitet. Der 
vorliegende Aufsatz widerspricht dieser These. Neuere Entwicklungen in industriellen 
Distrikts im "Dritten Italien" und Baden-Württemberg, den "Modellfällen" der 
Distriktliteratur, deuten auf Spannungen und Widersprüche. Widersprüche zwischen 
lokalen Bedürfnissen und globalen Kräften, betriebliche Flexibilität und 
Beschäftigungssicherheit, Risikoteilung und Risikoverlagerung, und betriebliche 
Effizienz und Arbeitsgerechtigkeit lassen Zweifel am industriellen Distrikt als Modell 
für eine "arbeitnehmerfreundliche" Regionalentwicklung angebracht erscheinen. 
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1. Introduction 
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The prolonged economic crisis that began in the advanced industrialized 
countries in the late 1970s has generated growing interest in network-based systems 
of production and exchange. Business firms have experimented with non-bureaucratic 
forms of production involving flexible work practices and cooperative - as opposed to 
competitive - external relations with competitors, suppliers, and customers. Labor 
unions have struggled with new approaches to employment protection that fit the 
conditions of flexible business networks. Also public policy makers have shown 
interest in flexible business networks, considering them a possible tool for economic 
renewal. Some observers see in recent economic restructuring efforts the emergence 
of a "new competition" (Best 1990), driven by small and entrepreneurial firms, 
dynamic business networks and alliances, and organizational innovations based on 
computerization and high technology. 
Underlying many of these developments is the idea of "flexible specialization", 
postulating the end of mass production and the tendency toward industrial de-
concentration. In situations where market competition is based on technology and 
product quality, product cycles are very short, and development costs are high, firms 
need to be particularly flexible to respond to unpredictable changes in the 
marketplace (Schoenberger 1988). Network-based production and exchange systems 
are seen as one way to achieve flexibility, where firms undertake core aspects of 
production in-house and outsource peripheral activities to specialist firms. The 
network as a whole is thought to be flexible to the extent that each task can be 
organized with a different mix of specialized producers. 
In this paper, we focus on business networks that are bounded geographically 
and are embedded in regional social structures, traditions, and political institutions. 
Such spatial networks are often referred to as regional clusters or "industrial 
districts." The literature on districts usually refers to specific regions in Northern and 
Central Italy, known as the "Third Italy" (Brusco 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984; 
Ricoveri et al. 1991) and the state of Baden-Württemberg in Southwest Germany 
(Sabel et al. 1989; Herrigel 1993), but recent discussions have included districts in 
Lower Austria (Grabher 1989), Jutland in Denmark (Hansen 1991), Quebec in 
Canada (Julien 1992), high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley in the U.S. and 
Cambridge, England (Saxenian 1989), and a variety of regional production clusters 
such as the film-making complex in Los Angeles (Storper and Christopherson 1987) 
and the aerospace sector in Southern California (Scott and Mattingly 1989). By 
definition, what sets industrial districts apart from other territorially based production 
clusters is their embeddedness in a particular social infrastructure that supports 
cooperation and trust among all economic actors and thus provides for mutual 
adjustment to changing circumstances. 
Our objective in this paper is to reflect critically on the concept of industrial 
district as a tool for economic development and renewal by examining tensions and 
contradictions with respect to outcomes for labor and employment. The strategic 
potential of industrial districts has had broad appeal ever since Piore and Sabel (1984) 
presented Italian small firm industrial districts as a new and desirable form of 
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production. Following early characterizations, discussions of industrial districts as a 
model for flexible specialization and endogenous regional economic development 
have often proceeded on an ideal-typical level. This is most evident, for example, in 
public policy attempts to replicate empirical experiences and relationships that are 
thought to possess model character (such as those in the "Third Italy"), without first 
exploring the particular circumstances that have shaped the evolution of structural 
arrangements in specific places. There is a danger that difficult concepts such as 
flexible specialization and industrial district are assuming a taken-for-granted reality 
without sufficient critical assessment. Especially in the area of business strategy and 
organization theory, only limited attention has been paid to the possibility that 
flexible networks in industrial districts have precarious outcomes for labor and 
employment relations, such as a weakening of labor power and a growing social and 
economic polarization of labor markets (for a critical analysis of oversights, see 
Harrison 1994). Instead, many researchers have preferred to comment on the benefits 
of organizational relationships, proposing that flexible networks permit firms to blend 
capabilities, share risks, and generate options, inter alia. Employment and labor 
market questions have generally not figured very prominently, except indirectly via 
the assumption that the economic success of industrial districts (measured in terms of 
export ratios or output growth) implies high levels of employment. Only in this way 
can there be some comfort in the observation that flexible small firm networks may 
"not lead to a 'quality culture' among producers ... [but have] helped to sustain local 
employment" (Bigarelli and Crestanello 1994, p. 141). 
There is a clear need to avoid theoretical over-simplifications in an attempt to 
make sense of complex empirical developments, lest explanations of district 
performance turn into myths and half-truths. In this paper, we draw attention to a 
number of tensions and contradictions in the employment regimes of industrial 
districts. To inform our analysis of these problem areas, we first outline the ideal-
typical characteristics of industrial districts that have generated so much interest in 
recent years. We conclude the paper with a brief discussion of the limitations of the 
district model for economic development policy. 
2. Hopes and Promises of Industrial Districts 
Industrial district is a term coined by Alfred Marshall (1890/1961), who 
described the external economies of scale that derive from the concentration of 
specialized firms and industries in particular locales. While he identified various 
economic relationships between long run production costs and access to specialized 
pools of land, labor, capital, energy, transportation, and so on, he also pointed to the 
role of an "industrial atmosphere". As a qualitative and sociological concept, the 
significance of an "industrial atmosphere" is that the full achievement of quantitative 
economies depends on the existence of a stable social infrastructure as the basis for 
consensus, cooperation, and "thick trust" among all actors in the network of interfirm 
relations. This infrastructure may include family and kinship-based connections as 
well as ties with network-relevant political-institutional actors, embedded in the 
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district's political tradition and social history. The presence of strong social bonds and 
historically sedimented relations among producers and other economic actors 
distinguishes industrial districts from other production agglomerations. 
Following Marshall (1890/1961), industrial districts are commonly defined as 
regionally agglomerated production systems in which autonomous firms, each 
specializing in particular tasks, are linked institutionally.1 Their success, from a 
district perspective, is based not necessarily on a particular product mix, rate of 
technological innovation, or firm size (as in conventional economic theory and 
business strategy), but derives from the cooperative organization of exchange 
relations among all actors in the district. These actors include not only the producers 
themselves, linked horizontally and vertically, but also service providers such as 
research institutes, funding agencies, consultants, labor unions, and development 
agencies. The district brings together organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 148). Given the 
high degree of cooperative interdependence, the fate of the individual firm is tied to 
the performance of the district as a whole, and thus firms have a vested interest in 
local development and stable network ties. 
Interfirm cooperation in industrial districts means that network relations are 
neither solely hierarchical (as in Fordist-type arrangements) nor purely market driven 
(as among atomistic competitors), but they contain elements of both. Reliability and 
stability derives from the actors' embeddedness in a social infrastructure that fosters 
trust as a basis for social compromise in times of change. Market-like flexibility is 
obtained from the fact that production is decentralized among specialized firms which 
can easily respond to shifting demand, because they do not need to maintain large 
inventories. From a district perspective, geographic proximity matters not so much 
because of the information or transportation economies it entails, but because it 
facilitates trust-building and cooperative learning through face-to-face interaction. 
The strategic significance of such networks lies in a learning process that helps firms 
discover their mutual dependencies on others with complementary specialized 
competencies (Hamel 1991). 
The current interest in business networking and industrial districts goes beyond 
the confines of business strategy theorizing, and is motivated by a variety of 
empirical observations and developments. One widely cited development since the 
1970s is the resurgence of small business and self-employment (Bögenhold and 
Staber 1991). Its alleged high rate of innovativeness, job creation, and flexibility have 
made the small business sector an attractive economic development tool. Trends in 
the large corporate sector toward vertical disintegration as well as innovations in 
production technology and organizational control that reduce the importance of scale 
economies are thought to provide opportunities for small establishments to prosper in 
volatile and specialized markets. Since small firms are, by definition, the backbone of 
                                                          
1 Our analysis excludes cooperatives, as the theory of industrial districts refers mainly to 
relations among private sector and profit oriented enterprises. 
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industrial districts, small-scale production and industrial districts complement each 
other in that districts rise and fall with the vitality of the small firm networks on 
which they are based. 
A second source of attraction of the industrial district model is that it conjures 
up images of responsible labor-management cooperation, as well as opportunities for 
labor re-skilling, multi-skilling, and autonomy (Piore and Sabel 1984). Sabel (1982), 
for example, refers to possibilities of returning to a kind of craft worker. This worker 
is thought to be comfortable with a regime that requires "collaboration between 
different kinds of workers and across levels of official skill hierarchy" (Sabel 1982, p. 
224), leading to a blurring of the boundary between intellectual and manual work. 
The standard argument is that flexible specialization in network-based production 
systems is unworkable without the full cooperation of employees and labor unions. 
Accordingly, flexible specialization in production networks is thought to lead to a 
recomposition of social relations benefitting both capital and labor. 
The current popularity of the industrial district concept is also in keeping with 
the rediscovery of regional and local economies as a possible source of economic 
self-sufficiency, independence, and social cohesion (Sabel 1989). To Alfred Marshall 
(1890/1961), the appropriate unit of economic activity was a territorial area, not a 
firm. Regional economies, he noted, were specialized around particular product lines 
(e.g., Solingen and Sheffield cutlery, Reutlingen and Prato textiles, Birmingham 
guns), and their flexibility depended in large part on extensive cooperative relations 
among all producers and associations in the district. Over time, powerful forces led to 
the development of Fordist mass production regimes and national governmental 
structures, subordinating regionally integrated economic activity. Recent 
developments in world markets, however, so the argument runs, have created 
conditions under which regional economies can outcompete national regimes. 
Heightened market uncertainty, shorter product life cycles, and greater consumer 
sovereignty are said to have altered the industrial organization of economic activity: 
the size distribution of firms, the degree of horizontal and vertical integration, the 
structure of input and output markets, and so on (Piore and Sabel 1984). As large 
corporations decentralize, they create the conditions for the "reconsolidation of the 
region as an integrated unit of production" (Sabel 1989, p. 18), where locational 
proximity confers important external economies of scale and scope. At the 
institutional level, strengthened regional governance structures can pursue their own 
development paths, so the argument goes, and thus free themselves from their 
dependence on global developments. 
Thus, there are several reasons why the industrial district model has enjoyed 
growing appeal in recent years. As locally integrated production and distribution 
systems, industrial districts support interfirm cooperation, benefitting firms, workers, 
and the regional economy as a whole. The general claim is that the particular social 
and economic organization of industrial districts leads to economies of scale and 
scope, innovativeness, and endogenously controlled industrial dynamism, and 
encourages the development and employment of highly skilled employees in "high-
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technology cottage industries" (Sabel 1982). Hence its appeal to developmental 
economists interested in building regional territorial integrity and expanding 
locational options, as well as labor relations theorists looking for opportunities of 
"responsible autonomy" and self-control at the workplace. 
To be sure, this is an ideal-typical depiction of an articulated industrial system, 
but its model character is often lost in efforts to fit empirical observations to 
theoretical preconceptions. In particular, the more policy oriented discussions of 
industrial districts have on occasions raised this concept to the level of a fetish, torn it 
out of its historical and spatial contexts, and obscured the empirical realities of 
districts as a "new regime of employment relations." But even some of the more 
academic discussions of the subject suggest teleological reasoning, selective 
interpretation of particular cases, and a tendency toward vulgar functionalism. An 
analysis of employment regimes in industrial districts reveals a number of tensions 
and contradictions that are often ignored in the current policy "push" toward districts 
as a model of endogenous regional development. 
3. The Other Side of Flexible Networks and Industrial Districts 
The limited success of industrial districts in some regions is often touted as a 
panacea for many of the problems associated with economic restructuring. However, 
there are several tensions and contradictions that limit the use of the district model for 
regional economic development, particularly if the intention is to generate the kinds 
of positive labor outcomes that Piore and Sabel (1984) and many of their followers 
have in mind. We examine four problem areas: contradictions between (1) 
regionalism and global forces; (2) corporate flexibility and employment security; (3) 
risk sharing and risk shifting; and (4) efficiency and equity. 
Our analysis focuses on empirical realities in the "Third Italy" and Baden-
Württemberg, as the regions that have received the most attention in the recent 
district literature. In the absence of comparative data sets, using identical variables 
and sampling criteria, we base our assessment of employment regimes on the 
available secondary literature. Much of the material that is useful for our purposes 
comes from papers published in small business and regional economics journals, but 
we also rely on anecdotal evidence found in the business press and trade journals. 
 
3.1  Regionalism versus Globalism 
Technology and organization are two key features of industrial change. In the 
last few decades, both have seen significant transformations in scope and breadth. 
Technological changes have become rapid and their diffusions swift, organizational 
forms have been changing, and the global division of labor has been altered. The 
1980s saw a dramatic increase in the number and value of mergers and acquisitions in 
the U.S. and Western Europe, as well as a proliferation of strategic alliances and joint 
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ventures. More importantly for our analysis, a growing number of mergers, 
acquisitions, and alliances are across regional and national borders, reflecting the 
internationalization of interfirm cooperation and the evolution of many firms into 
"global enterprise networks" (Perlmutter 1992). Products such as Apple computers 
and Boeing airplanes have become global products as "no one nation or firm is 
responsible for designing, manufacturing, and marketing these products in their 
entirety" (Simon 1993, p. 53). 
The globalization of production is in stark contrast to the premise of the local or 
regional boundedness of industrial districts. Industrial districts, as a model for 
endogenous local development, are aimed at strengthening local competencies and 
integrating the various stages in the chain of production within the region 
(Sengenberger 1993). But this image does not fit well the reality of many districts. 
Rather than enhancing ties to local firms and shoring up the local infrastructure for 
innovation, globally active firms are seeking competitive advantages wherever they 
can find them. Not only are district firms looking for outward investment 
opportunities, but districts themselves are being transformed by the inward 
investment of firms headquartered elsewhere, as in the case of the high-tech sector in 
Silicon Valley (Teece 1992) and Cambridge (Crang and Martin 1991). The Italian 
districts, too, are undergoing changes, as firms are increasingly substituting external 
linkages for local ones (Amin 1989). 
We suspect the economic success of Baden-Württemberg since the 1960s has 
been partly attributable to the dynamics and innovativeness of small and medium 
sized enterprises and partly to the existence of such large and global firms as 
Daimler-Benz, Porsche, IBM, and Bosch. Many smaller firms in the industrial 
districts of Baden-Württemberg are suppliers to these large firms (Cooke and Morgan 
1993). While this arrangement may benefit small firms in economically good times, 
their survival under the umbrella of large corporations is generally precarious during 
economic downturns, when large firms attempt to assert hierarchical control over 
smaller subcontractors in their network. 
Technical innovation is necessary for the survival of businesses in today's 
technology-dominated global marketplace. However, small firms are generally not 
able to compete with larger firms in this respect and thus depend on their 
participation in interfirm networks as a source of knowledge and other inputs. This is 
particularly true in Italian districts where small firms predominate, but even there 
collaborative structures are often not sufficient to help firms overcome chronic 
funding problems (The Economist 1994). The district model asserts that interfirm 
networks are internal to the regional district, but it is more likely that, in a global 
economy, they tend to expand beyond district boundaries, depending on the source 
and availability of technological knowledge. Also, to the extent that technological 
innovation within districts is confined to a small number of firms, the possibility 
arises that some of them evolve into larger, 'elite' firms, and eventually become a 
target for takeover by multinational corporations, including those headquartered 
elsewhere. This has already happened in the engineering industries of Emilia-
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Romagna to some degree (Murray 1987; Amin and Robins 1990). Along with this 
development may come the growing concentration of ownership, vertical integration 
of functions, and a new spatial international division of labor where firms in the 
districts function as dependent nodes in the global production networks of 
international corporations, and where districts themselves become nodes of larger, 
global webs. The idealized production structure of Italian districts may thus become 
overshadowed by the investment strategies and outsourcing activities of global 
players (Amin and Robins 1990). Evidence suggests that this is happening in other 
districts as well. For example, Christopherson and Redfield's (1993) study of the 
"ceramics corridor" in New York State showed that small firms in this district have 
been functioning in the shadow of Corning, the by far largest and dominant firm in 
the region, which has absorbed most of the benefits of publicly provided producer 
services aimed at building technical know-how. 
In Baden-Württemberg, many of the larger corporations have begun to look for 
more outsourcing opportunities outside the region in which they are supposedly 
embedded. Daimler-Benz, for example, is planning a significant reduction of direct 
suppliers in its motor vehicle division, while lowering its in-house production from 
45 percent to under 40 percent and raising the proportion of foreign outsourcing from 
15 percent to 25 percent. Bosch is shifting more of its production of electric tools 
abroad, in particular to low-wage countries, to increase its foreign share of production 
above the already high level of 63 percent (Handelsblatt, 4.2.1994). Porsche is 
planning to reduce the number of its suppliers from over 900 in 1993 to about 300 by 
1997 and to rely more on outsourcing to foreign firms (Handelsblatt, 22.3.1994). A 
recent survey of businesses in a variety of industries in the Bodensee region of 
Baden-Württemberg indicated that international sourcing is a growing and general 
phenomenon (Hahn and Gaiser 1994). Business strategies, according to this study, are 
driven mostly by competitive pressures. In those instances where interfirm relations 
are cooperative they are rarely limited to the region and often go beyond even 
national boundaries. For example, in the knitwear district in the Zolleralb region in 
Baden-Württemberg cooperative arrangements with foreign producers has become a 
survival strategy for many firms (Textil-Wirtschaft 18.11.1993). 
Similar tendencies have been observed in the "Third Italy", where a growing 
number of firms are moving production and distribution facilities to low-wage 
countries in Asia and Eastern Europe. In the textile and apparel districts, for example, 
the current perception expressed by trade association officials is that relocating 
production and other activities beyond district boundaries has become a matter of 
commercial survival for all actors involved (Textil-Wirtschaft, 21.10.1993). 
Commentators on these developments note the apparent increase in competitive 
rivalry, at the expense of district-type cooperation. "The 'every man for himself' 
mentality has led to a battle of all against all, without coordination and without the 
support of governmental policy" (Textil-Wirtschaft, 21.10.1993, p. 74). As a 
consequence of intensified competition business populations have been contracting 
and employment levels have been declining. For example, in the Prato district 
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(Emilia-Romagna), long a center of textile production in Italy, the number of firms 
fell from about 17,000 to 11,000 between 1985 and 1993 (Textil-Wirtschaft, 
23.6.1994), and many of the survivors are relying more on foreign production (Textil-
Wirtschaft, 10.3.1994). 
The knitwear and clothing district of Carpi (Emilia-Romagna) has seen a similar 
development in recent years. The number of firms fell by 20 percent between 1981 
and 1991, while employment growth came to a halt, for the first time since 1950 
(Bigarelli and Crestanello 1994). The closures affected mostly the smallest firms. 
Many of the surviving businesses have intensified their subcontracting relations with 
firms outside the district, with the largest firms decentralizing abroad, so that in 1988 
about two-thirds of the entire industry workforce were employed outside the region. 
The primary reason given for externalizing production outside the region is the 
intention to save on costs by outsourcing to areas where labor costs are lower. As a 
result, "inter-firm relations inside the area have weakened" (Bigarelli and Crestanello 
1994, p. 139).2 
These developments suggest that the strategic use of business networking 
requires a global perspective, contrary to the demands of locally embedded industrial 
districts. As the CEO of Mercedes-Benz in Baden-Württemberg emphasized, "if there 
is anything positive we have learnt from our performance last year [1993], it is the 
fact that we depend on the globalization of our activities not only for cost and 
industry structural reasons, but also because we need to spread risks" (Handelsblatt, 
27.1.1994). For this company, and we suspect for others as well, in highly 
competitive markets cooperative relations with other firms, both within and outside a 
district, are probably informed more by economic calculus than social considerations 
or historical habit. Commenting on relations with foreign partners, the Mercedes-
Benz executive noted that "everyone talks with everyone else, because we are all 
forced to seek scale economies and to enhance our internal flexibility" (Handelsblatt, 
27.1.1994). If many of the small and medium-sized enterprises in Baden-
Württemberg do not follow their larger competitors abroad, it is not necessarily out of 
a sense of social obligation to their region, as the district model would have it, but 
because they cannot afford the financial costs of moving their business (Handelsblatt, 
6.4.1994). 
In sum, the alleged return to regionalized production complexes is in direct 
conflict with globalization pressures. The strategies of international companies have 
made territorial boundaries increasingly insignificant and have eroded the capacity of 
                                                          
2 One of the reasons for this dramatic increase in business failure rates in the Italian textile and 
apparel sector lies in the build-up of overcapacities during the 1980s. According to some 
observers, many firms pursued their investment strategies independently and without even 
consulting their industry associations (Textil-Wirtschaft, 7.10.1993). Such behavior is, of 
course, quite inconsistent with the district model's emphasis on business collaboration and the 
joint use of collective services. Also, the build-up of excess capacities in this sector is not 
unique to districts, but is common to most of the industries and regions in the developed 
economies (Jensen 1993). 
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governments to manage regional and even national economies (Held and McGrew 
1993). To many observers "national champion" corporations have become global 
webs with no particular national affiliation (Reich 1991), even if they are thought to 
have a "home" base. As Amin and Robins (1990, p. 28) stated, "In the 20th century, 
the local economy can only be seen as a node within a global economic network; and 
it can have no meaningful existence outside this context. If we consider that this 
global arena is shaped and informed by formidable relations of power, then the scope 
for local autonomy and proactivity becomes considerably narrow." One might then 
ask whether it is not premature to write off large firms and their ability to survive as 
highly integrated producers, as many "flexible specialization" and district theorists 
have done.3 Since large and globally active firms are in a strategic position to play off 
particular local networks, the viability of districts and the employment stability of the 
workforce depends to an important degree on the willingness of the large corporate 
players to source locally and to support the local institutional infrastructure. As we 
noted above, recent developments in world markets have put pressure also on smaller 
firms to build relations outside the district, thus weakening interfirm relations within 
a given region. There are thus tensions and contradictions inherent in the spatial 
concentration of industrial districts and the growing international orientation of many 
businesses. The recent experience of districts suggests that these contradictions are 
not always resolved in a manner consistent with the district model. Globally oriented 
corporations are not likely to let the particularistic needs of regions override 
international imperatives (Streeck 1991). 
3.2 Corporate Flexibility versus Employment Security 
The employment regimes in industrial districts are often seen as an example of 
the type of arrangements required in the new economy (Best 1990). One of the basic 
characteristics of such arrangements is flexibility in the production system, in 
organizational design, and in employment relations and labor market organizations. 
The literature has discussed a number of business strategies for labor market 
flexibility: numerical, functional, financial, and temporal flexibilities (Atkinson 1984; 
Storper and Scott 1990). Numerical flexibility refers to the ability of a firm to 
respond to changes in demand and output by altering the volume of labor inputs. 
Functional flexibility involves the broadening of tasks performed and skills deployed 
by employees. Financial flexibility means moving away from a strictly time-based 
pay system to a productivity or performance-based pay system. Temporal flexibility 
concerns the distribution of working time, including the use of casual and temporary 
employees. 
The literature on Italian districts suggests that firms make extensive use of labor 
market flexibility and that such flexibility is a competitive advantage of districts. In 
                                                          
3 Even Piore and Sabel (1984) admitted that the particular collective bargaining structure in 
Germany permits large corporations opportunities for flexible specialization without the 
vertical disintegration characteristic of industrial districts. 
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engineering firms, for example, skilled male machinists, fitters and technicians need 
to perform both manual and conceptual tasks - a case of functional flexibility. An 
extensive use of family workers by firms and a lack of restrictions on hiring and 
firing in small artisan firms facilitate both numerical and temporal flexibilities 
(Murray 1987). Since firms in industrial districts are predicated on flexibility, one 
would expect that they will make extensive use of flexible employment arrangements, 
as reflected, for example, in the proportion of peripheral and part-time workers. 
Unfortunately, systematic and comparative data on flexible employment strategies are 
not available at the enterprise level, to test this expectation, and at the regional level 
data are available only for part-time employment and for select years. 





female      male         all 
1979     
female         male           all 
 1990 
   all 
Germany 
  Baden-Württ. 
  Stuttgart 
 20,0         1,0           7,7 
 21,1         1,2           8,6 
 19,9         0,8           7,8 
 24,2            1,0            9,5 
 25,5            1,0           10,5 




   
Italy 
  Emilia-Romagna 
  Veneto 
  Tuscany 
  8,5         2,3           3,9 
 12,8         2,9           5,9 
  7,3         2,3           3,6 
  8,6         2,1           3,7 
 6,0             1,2            2,6 
 7,4             1,5            3,5 
 6,6             1,3            2,9 
 5,3             1,0            2,3 
  4,9 
   5,5 
   4,9 
   6,6 
 
  
Source: Eurostat, 1975, 1981, 1993. 
 
 
Table 1 shows part-time employment rates in Baden-Württemberg, the state's 
capital region Stuttgart, and the three most widely cited Italian industrial districts, 
Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, and Tuscany (which themselves contain smaller and more 
specialized districts). In most of the three years shown, the part-time employment rate 
was generally higher in the districts than the national averages. The differences, 
however, are not large enough to suggest that industrial districts are unique in that 
respect.4 Also, part-time employment rates were higher in 1990 than in the 1970s, in 
both countries and all regions. This seems to indicate that numerical flexibility, 
defined this way, is not just confined to industrial districts, but is becoming an 
important aspect of labor market strategy everywhere (Blyton and Morris 1991). The 
demand for corporate flexibility in terms of using labor as a variable factor of 
production has increased, and in that respect the employment regime of industrial 
districts is not unique. 
                                                          
4 Certainly, three observation years give a very selective picture of relationships, and hide the 
effects of business cycle and institutional developments. For our argument, however, the main 
comparisons are between district and national rates, and not across countries or over time. 
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The most recent collective agreements in Germany, as in Italy and elsewhere 
(Hyman 1994), reveal a clear trend toward more differentiated approaches to 
worktime flexibility. Contracts continue to be written at the sectoral level, but they 
are increasingly taking on a more general framework character, leaving considerable 
room for interpretation and application at the enterprise and even plant level 
(Handelsblatt, 7.3.1994; Daniels and Lamparter 1994). For example, the length of the 
workday and workweek may now vary considerably over the course of the year, 
depending on market conditions. Despite the greater flexibility of sectoral 
agreements, the incidence of firms deviating from such contracts has been on the 
increase, without necessarily causing labor resistance (Handelsblatt, 31.1.1994). 
Even if the emphasis on workforce flexibility were limited to industrial districts, 
the implications for labor are probably not as benign as the district model tends to 
imply. There may be a reasonable degree of employment security for full-time, core 
employees, but this security is largely bought at the expense of a volatile peripheral 
workforce. Part-time employees and contract workers are often not entitled to the 
same benefits that full-time employees receive, unionization rates are usually much 
lower, and protective labor legislation tends to be substandard for such workers 
(Hinrichs 1989). As a result, there is little or no employment security for peripheral 
employees, as firms use contingent workers as a buffer to absorb fluctuations in 
demand (Pfeffer 1994). 
Industrial districts in both the "Third Italy" and Baden-Württemberg have a 
strong craft-artisan tradition, which is often assumed to be an important foundation 
for current economic success (Ricoveri et al. 1991; Medick 1993). From the district 
perspective, a strong artisan tradition leads not only to a commitment to skill building 
and innovativeness, but is part of the social "glue" that holds the production complex 
together in times of stress. To some observers, artisan traditions help explain the 
absence of labor unions and labor strife in Italian districts, but there is also a 
downside to artisanship. In Italy, artisan shops employing fewer than 23 in-house 
employees were exempt, after 1970, from labor and social security laws, while in the 
engineering sectors the exemption applied to firms with fewer than 15 workers. In 
1987, the threshold for legislative protection against dismissal was reduced to cover 
employees in firms with at least 8 workers, but this still leaves out a substantial 
proportion of the workforce in Italian districts. Also, the degree of unionization in the 
"Third Italy" is lower in some sectors than Piore and Sabel (1984) claimed [see 
Murray (1987) for the data]. Recent surveys also report a general lowering of labor 
standards, the intensification of work effort, and, as in Germany, the decentralization 
of bargaining to the enterprise or branch level (Amin 1989; Perulli 1990). It would 
appear that competition from small and lower paying firms in Italian districts has 
forced unions into a reactive position. In Baden-Württemberg, and elsewhere in 
Germany, the situation is somewhat different, at least formally. But, as noted above, 
even there pressures on unions to concede have been mounting in recent years. These 
developments are inconsistent with the district model's emphasis on strong and 
supportive labor unions. 
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Internal, or functional, flexibility requires workers' willingness to learn and 
apply broad skills, to use their creative powers, and to exercise self-discipline (Gertler 
1993). Attaining the objectives of flexible networks (customizing products to small 
market segments, quality improvement, technological upgrading of the production 
process, and so on) requires a workplace organization that promotes the 
empowerment of workers. As research on the positive influence of unionization on 
workplace productivity in the United States has shown (Freeman and Medoff 1984; 
Katz et al. 1985), this can best be achieved in the presence of strong and responsible 
labor unions, works councils, or other forms of interest representation. But the recent 
experience of many industrial districts has been a general erosion, rather than 
strengthening, of union power. 
While internal flexibility requires the ability of firms to assign workers to 
variable tasks, external flexibility requires labor mobility across firms. The argument, 
from a district perspective, is that workers are more likely to be mobile and invest in 
their human capital if their employment security within the district is guaranteed. 
Likewise, employers are more likely to invest in labor training if the institutional 
structure of the district supports stability and a long term commitment between all 
employers and workers. This condition is more likely to be met in a unionized setting, 
where institutional mechanisms for promoting employment security within the 
district are in place. It seems obvious that, unless unions have sufficient bargaining 
power and are willing to pursue intra-district solidarity strategies on wages and 
working conditions, "flexible specialization" in business networks can easily 
degenerate into a competitive game of worker exploitation. 
A functional requirement of labor market flexibility in districts is that labor 
interests are well represented at the district level, and not only at the national, 
sectoral, or enterprise level. That is, the structure of interest representation in districts 
needs to mirror the industrial organization of production. That unions are organized 
accordingly and play a strong role in the shaping of networks in industrial districts is 
far from clear. In Italian districts, it is usually local governments and political parties 
that coordinate interests (Streeck, 1991). In Baden-Württemberg, as elsewhere, 
regional interest representation is subject to global pressures, as reflected in union 
demands for European works councils and transnational social legislation. Even 
within Baden-Württemberg, it is not clear that unions have played the kind of role in 
state and local governments' innovation policies that would meet the theoretical 
premises of the district model (Schmitz, 1992). Unions are often excluded from 
official positions on advisory councils and have limited access to informal networks. 
Even in small and medium-size firms with works councils, the representation of labor 
interests is rarely as effective as is intended by legislation (Wassermann 1990). "The 
consequence, of course, is that such groups participate in the system without 
participating directly in the process of collective self-definition" (Herrigel 1993, p. 
233). 
Thus, to the extent that industrial districts evolve on the terms of capital - to 
maximize organizational flexibility - the role of labor is relegated to that of a reactive 
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recipient of initiatives and policy programs, rather than an active participant in 
shaping employment regimes. This outcome contradicts the assumption of effective 
labor participation in industrial districts, a basic tenet of the district model. 
3.3 Risk Taking versus Risk Sharing 
While large, multinational firms can survive on the basis of limited risk-taking, 
small businesses with limited resources tend to avoid risk-taking activities. Because 
most small firms cannot produce all the components of broad product portfolios, they 
are unable to be at the forefront of product development and fast-changing 
technologies, and to gain access to diverse markets. For this reason alone, small 
businesses find it useful to participate in a network of firms with which they share the 
risks of operating in diverse and dynamic markets, as long as they retain their self-
sufficiency. 
According to the district model, small firms compete on the basis of product 
quality and flexibility. This requires continuous research and development as well as 
training employees for skill development. Because of limited resources and a 
tendency to avoid risk-taking, a small firm will not be able to undertake these 
activities as effectively as larger companies. However, through the development of 
joint research centers, vocational and technical training institutions, and district level 
strategic planning mechanisms, the risks associated with such activities can be shared 
among network firms, local governments, and other service providers. In Italy's 
Modena district (in Emilia-Romagna), for example, local governments and small 
artisan firms have created a technological infrastructure and provided for joint 
vocational training (Perulli 1990). In the Carpi district, clothing firms have access to 
a variety of research centers and data banks (Bigarelli and Crestanello 1994). In 
Baden-Württemberg, the machine tool and textile industries can rely on a myriad of 
quasi-public intermediary institutions for technology transfer and labor training 
(Schmitz 1992; Herrigel 1993). Nevertheless, even among cooperating firms risk 
sharing often turns into risk shifting, especially from large to small firms, and from 
central districts to peripheral districts. 
To a large extent the employment security or stability that is possible within a 
district depends on the ability to delegate the risks of adjustment to variable 
conditions to peripheral firms in the district or in adjacent regions. Experience shows 
that larger firms tend to diffuse the cost of adjustment during economic downturns 
throughout the system, turning the smaller firms in the district into "shock absorbers." 
In the Carpi clothing district, for example, recent changes in the organization of 
production have added flexibility to the production schedule, but the costs of this 
flexibility are borne mostly by the increasing number of highly specialized and small 
firms that produce "just in time" and that do not operate throughout the year. About a 
third of the total production in the Carpi district is of a "just in time" type, while 
much of the scheduled and more predictable part of production is subcontracted to 
firms located outside the region (Bigarelli and Crestanello 1994). In the Zolleralb 
knitwear district in Baden-Württemberg, large producers benefit from subcontracting 
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relations with very small firms that close operations "on demand." The number of 
such dependent businesses has been growing in recent years (Textil-Wirtschaft 
18.11.1993). 
For larger firms, strategic networking through subcontracting to small suppliers 
enhances their own flexibility while passing the associated risks to smaller firms. 
Benetton, for example, has extensive subcontracting relations with small firms 
(Taplin 1989, p. 11), and at least one study suggests that this company dominates the 
production chain and pressures subcontractors to work exclusively for it (Belussi 
1987). To the extent that the larger company can instrumentalize market demands to 
pressure its suppliers into "passive pliability" (Semlinger 1993, p. 170), the much-
celebrated "partnership" in industrial districts ends up being one-sided. Supplier firms 
in the German automobile industry recently formed an association, to defend their 
interests against the pressures exerted by automobile manufacturers. The head of this 
association complained about the contradiction between the demands of cooperative 
interfirm relations, commonly couched in terms of "partnership", and the growing 
insistence of large-scale producers on contracts that may be cancelled on short notice 
(Handelsblatt, 13.4.1994).5 To survive under such conditions, small firms often resort 
to labor externalization strategies, by terminating their own peripheral workers or by 
replacing core workers with more easily expendable temporary workers. By doing so 
these small firms risk losing the very advantage they have over large companies, 
namely a highly skilled and committed workforce that can be employed in variable 
settings (Semlinger 1993). 
We suspect that the pressures of external market competition, to which 
businesses in industrial districts are not immune, drive firms into strategic behavior 
that is more informed by efficiency considerations than the kind of social obligations 
that characterize ideal-typical districts. The outcome is that market opportunities must 
be "exploited", just to remain competitive, and that forming alliances with firms 
outside the district become a viable least-cost alternative to commitment to network 
relations within the district. Above we noted the tendency in recent years of firms in 
the "Third Italy" and Baden-Württemberg to move production facilities to low-wage 
countries. Research on Italian districts has also shown that family enterprises can be 
an important source of business flexibility, enabling small firms to accept pressures 
from larger companies in the networks. Family-owned businesses - mostly small ones 
- account for some 99 percent of Italy's companies (The Economist 1994) and are 
especially widespread in Italian districts. Recoveri et al. (1991) found that in such 
businesses the younger members of a family are often forced to accept poorly-paid 
jobs and that many women accept long working hours and casual employment 
contracts. Sengenberger and Pyke (1991) noted that in many districts families, and 
the networks in which they are embedded, are an important means of employment 
                                                          
5 In contradiction to the model of interfirm cooperation in districts, the complaint is made that 
confidential design blueprints are often passed on to competitors, without the supplier's 
permission (Handelsblatt, 26.4.1994). 
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security in difficult economic times, but the wage levels and long hours they accept 
can hardly be said to fulfill the promise of the district model. 
In short, to the extent that network relations in industrial districts are not 
symmetric, risk sharing can turn into risk shifting from dominant firms to the 
smallest, most vulnerable firms. In this case, it is the peripheral employee who pays 
for the cost of economic adjustment required of those firms. Put differently, the cost 
of surviving in competitive markets is being shifted to communities and to employees 
in the periphery of the industrial district. Even embedding has its contradictions. This 
raises the question whether business efficiency in industrial districts is at the expense 
of employee equity. 
3.4 Business Efficiency versus Employment Equity 
Under normal circumstances, efficiency is an important goal of business, while 
equity is important to many employees, but these goals are not necessarily 
incompatible if properly implemented. There is a growing recognition among 
organization and labor relations theorists that business survival in a highly 
competitive marketplace demands the adoption of human resource management 
strategies that treat the workforce as a competitive advantage, and not as a cost to be 
minimized or avoided. Pfeffer (1994), for example, describes a number of human 
resource management practices (selective recruiting, high wage policy, information 
sharing, and so on) that are aimed at building sustainable and difficult-to-imitate 
competitive advantages. What they have in common is that they entail considerable 
involvement and responsibility on the part of the work force. While participative 
human resource strategies are useful in a variety of situations, they are an essential 
characteristic of management-labor relations in industrial districts, premised on 
notions of trust, employee empowerment, and teamwork. In that sense, industrial 
districts are "worker friendly" by definition, but the reality does not always conform 
to ideal-typical characterizations. 
The promise of worker emancipation in industrial districts raises the idea of 
employment equity as a broad social objective. The intention is to avoid labor market 
segregation along racial, gender and skill lines, and to prevent the marginalization of 
certain employee groups. The evidence, however, suggests that either there continues 
to exist significant labor market segmentation in districts or recent changes in the 
marketplace have forced a return to earlier (i.e. Fordist) forms of industrial 
capitalism. We already noted the heavy use of underpaid family labor in Italian 
districts, but labor markets are also segregated by gender. The knitwear workforce in 
the Carpi region, for example, shows a high degree of segmentation along gender 
lines, with women disproportionately working in production or at home (not 
necessarily involuntarily), and men working as better-paid artisans (Solinas 1982). 
The picture is similar in other industries in the Third Italy. Murray (1987) reports that 
only a fifth of engineering employees are women, and that 96 percent of them work 
in the three lowest skill grades, while 66 percent of male engineering workers are in 
the three highest grades. The organization of production in the "Third Italy" has 
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promoted significant labor market segregation in that "quality craft work is done by 
Emilian men, semi-skilled assembly work by women, and heavy foundry and forging 
work by Southern Italian and North African workers" (Murray 1987, p. 88). Studies 
have shown extensive secondary labor markets even in high-technology sectors, such 
as in Southern California (Scott 1992), Silicon Valley (Florida and Kenney 1990), 
and Cambridge (Crang and Martin 1991). 
In the Italian small firm sector in general, industrial relations and working 
conditions vary widely due to the absence of unions and protective labor legislation. 
The homeworking sector is, of course, even less well protected. In the larger firms 
there may be wide skill differences, but their relatively high degree of unionization 
prevents wide wage differentials. Since 1970, employees in Italy have had the right to 
union representation at the workplace, called Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie, who 
play a role similar to that of a Vertrauensmann in Germany. New legislative 
developments provide that two-thirds of the representatives on this body are directly 
elected by the workers and the rest are selected from the list of candidates presented 
by the trade unions signing the national sectoral collective agreement (European 
Industrial Relations Review 1994a). However, work units with less than 15 
employees do not come under the jurisdiction of this Act. This leaves out about a 
third of the employed workforce, including the majority of those employed in Italian 
industrial districts (Pellegrini 1993, p. 145). Recently negotiated "solidarity 
contracts" in Italy, providing for reductions in pay and working time, are available 
only in large companies and are seen by some observers as further evidence of an 
increasingly segmented labor market. Workers in small businesses can rely only on 
unemployment benefits, which stand at 27 percent of previous pay and which are 
available for only six months (European Industrial Relations Review 1994b). 
The relatively high rate of unionization in Baden-Württemberg, coupled with the 
right to works councils in enterprises with more than five employees, tends to limit 
the kind of exploitation of women and minorities that is typical in many other 
regions. Recent developments in business populations, however, suggest increased 
tendencies toward labor market segmentation there as well. The Stuttgart region, for 
example, saw a real decline in the number of establishments in the mid-1980s 
(Audretsch and Fritsch 1992). The fact that the rate at which new businesses are 
established in this region has been below the average for all other regions in West 
Germany may suggest a process of resource deconcentration, encouraging the 
polarization of the labor force. Consistent with this argument is the finding that in the 
Stuttgart region the rate of business foundings in the service sector has exceeded that 
in manufacturing. Because new firms in the service sector tend to be small and 
heterogeneous with respect to employment outcomes (e.g., wage levels, working 
hours, employment security), there is the possibility that employment opportunities in 
this region are becoming more, rather than less, segregated. 
The recent experience in Italian districts is similar to that in Baden-Württemberg 
(Fumagalli and Mussati 1993), with respect to business founding rates. Firm birth 
rates have declined in the manufacturing sector - in stark contrast to the rates 
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observed in the 1970s - while growing slightly in services. Fumagalli and Mussati 
(1993) note that most of the new firms are marginal businesses operating in industries 
with low scale economies and barriers to entry, or they are small subcontractors 
dependent on the investment strategies of large corporations. The profit performance 
of the small firm sector in these districts deteriorated throughout the 1980s, in marked 
contrast to their performance in the 1970s when the district model became first 
popularized. The picture of Italian districts that emerges is anything but comforting, 
from a district theoretic perspective. "The idea of a flexible system of production as a 
new form of labour organization and economic strategies (with all the implications of 
public policy) is strongly declining and, if the small firms are relatively profitable, 
this seems to reflect the prevalence of low wages and poor working conditions, rather 
than superior economic dynamism" (Fumagalli and Mussati 1993, p. 32). 
Consistent with this conclusion, unemployment rates of males and females in 
industrial districts show no evidence of employment equity,6 defined as such. The 
data in Table 2 indicate that, while unemployment rates for both genders in Baden-
Württemberg, the Stuttgart region, and the Italian districts have been below the rates 
at the national level, rates for females have consistently exceeded those of males. 
Also, female and male unemployment rates have widened since 1973, in all regions 
considered in Table 2. The data in Table 1 show that in all regions women are far 
more likely to be employed part-time than men, suggesting that employment 
opportunities for women are as restricted in industrial districts as elsewhere. 
Table 2: Regional Comparisons of Unemployment Rates (as % of Total Employment) 
 
 Region 1973 
female     male       all 
1979 
female     male       all 
1991 




  0,8        0,4         0,5 
  0,6        0,2         0,4 
  0,5        0,2         0,3  
  3,5         1,8         2,7 
  2,4         1,1         1,6 
  2,1         0,9         1,4 
  5,0         3,7        4,2 
 3,1         2,0        2,4 






  6,1        3,3         4,0 
  7,1        1,8         3,5            
  3,9        2,1         2,5 
  4,6        1,6         2,4   
 
  8,6         3,8         5,3 
  7,5         1,6         3,6 
  6,2         2,3         3,5 
  6,6         2,2         3,6 
15,8        6,8       10,2 
 7,7        1,9         4,3 
 6,6        2,5         4,1 
12,9        4,2        7,6 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, 1975, 1981, 1993. 
                                                          
 6 Industrial districts in Jutland, Denmark, may well be an interesting exception, where at least 
one study has shown high rates of unionization and high wage rates throughout the districts 
(Hansen 1991). This study, however, like many others, may suffer from a selection bias in the 
sample, as only existing firms were surveyed, and thus information on workers displaced 
from failed firms was missed. For purposes of understanding employment outcomes it is 
particularly important that researchers survey complete business populations, including failed 
firms (Staber and Aldrich 1989). 
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Given the available evidence, the promise of industrial districts fostering 
employment equity and an equal distribution of economic opportunities appears 
somewhat hollow. The familiar tension between the need of management to control 
the labor process and to promote worker initiative and commitment (Hyman 1994) is 
as pressing in industrial districts as elsewhere. To the extent that interfirm relations 
within and across districts derive their flexibility from the existence of secondary 
labor markets, where employment is precarious and marginal, such districts do not 
live up to their reputation as a craft and worker "utopia". In many districts, as 
elsewhere, the economic reality is that businesses tend to pursue traditional cost-
minimization strategies to survive in a competitive market environment. This is 
particularly true in the much acclaimed Italian districts where horizontal competition 
among firms is becoming fierce and vertical cooperation weak (Fumagalli and 
Mussati 1993). One may wonder about the conditions under which the social fabric of 
industrial districts is strong enough to withstand the onslaught of distant and 
impersonal economic forces. 
4. Concluding Remarks: Possibilities for Public Policy? 
The idea of industrial district has attracted the interest of people concerned with 
business and labor flexibility, and has been hailed as a model for regional economic 
renewal. While the model has a number of attractive features, we identified several 
tensions and contradictions with negative outcomes for labor and employment. Our 
analysis focused on the reality of industrial districts in Italy and Baden-Württemberg 
and noted some broad similarities. 
However, there are also some differences between the two regions which need to 
be kept in mind, as they may have implications for the structure and dynamics of 
employment regimes. First, the regions differ with respect to the size distribution of 
firms. Italian districts have a greater proportion of very small firms than Baden-
Württemberg. The average employment size of business units in the industrial 
districts of Italy is 8 workers, whereas in Baden-Württemberg only about 15 percent 
of the industrial workforce is accounted for by firms employing fewer than 100 
workers. Differences in firm size explain partly why the degree of union penetration 
is higher in Baden-Württemberg than in the Italian districts. Second, the extent of 
self-employment is much higher in Italian districts than in Baden-Württemberg. Only 
about five percent of industrial workers are self-employed in Baden-Württemberg as 
compared to about 15 percent in the Emilia-Romagna region in Italy. A high rate of 
self-employment is generally indicative of significant labor force polarization 
(Bögenhold and Staber 1991). Finally, if one makes a distinction between labor-
intensive flexible specialization and technology-intensive flexible specialization 
(Storper and Scott 1990), then a majority of businesses in Italian industrial districts 
fall in the former category and more of the business units in Baden-Württemberg in 
the latter. This distinction is important because labor-intensive flexible specialization 
is related to employment instability and low wages, whereas the technology-intensive 
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flexible specialization is more conducive to employment stability, acquisition of firm-
specific skills, and higher wage levels. 
If there is one observation that is common to most studies of industrial districts 
it is that they represent unique and historically sedimented structures. Each district 
has undergone its own specific development, rooted in local culture and tradition 
(Curry 1993; for a sample of regional studies, see Zeitlin 1989, and Pyke and 
Sengenberger 1992). The "Third Italy", for example, comprises a number of distinct 
regions with specific subcultures, political traditions, and institutional arrangements 
that include interest groups, political parties, welfare structures, business services, 
and so on (Triglia 1986). Even more dramatic are the observed differences across 
industrial districts when the national context of economic and policy regimes is 
considered, indicating variations in factors such as firm size distribution, the extent of 
business integration in global networks, and the level of government expenditures in 
critical industries. Localized cultures are important forces shaping the regional 
economy via business norms, worker habits, and even linguistic dialects (Scott and 
Storper 1992). But equally important are the institutional-regulatory regimes at the 
national level which constrain possibilities for regional economic development 
(Saxenian 1989). 
Despite the existence of significant differences in the properties, origins, and 
evolutionary dynamics of contemporary industrial districts, there is a tendency among 
practitioners in business and government to search for generic elements of districts 
that can be replicated. Public policy discussions in particular often proceed on the 
assumption that there is a model of districts that can be transferred or adapted to other 
regional contexts. This approach is understandable, but it is fundamentally flawed for 
a number of reasons. 
First, it is not clear what these generic properties of successful districts are. For 
example, accounts of collaboration make much of the role of trust between interacting 
enterprises and between employers and workers, but it is not clear what the important 
sources of trust are and to what extent trust-building can be engineered. As Zeitlin 
(1992, pp. 286-287) noted, "under the right circumstances, it would appear, almost 
any set of common experiences can form the basis of a common culture." To date, 
however, no comparative studies have been attempted with the express purpose of 
identifying those conditions and how they can be created. 
Second, even if generic properties could be identified, it is not self-evident that 
it is these properties that account for the observed economic success of districts. If, 
for example, trust and consensus-based political cultures are so important and exist in 
many regions, then why have they not led to similar economic performance outcomes 
in all regions? Without doubt, other variables are at play as well, including luck, 
error, and chance. As Schmitz (1992) noted, the economic success of Baden-
Württemberg during the 1980s may have much to do with the fact that the economy 
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is dominated by a few industries (electronics, motor vehicles, and machine tools) that 
did particularly well at that time in key export markets.7 
Social consensus is not a static phenomenon, but evolves with changing 
circumstances. The evidence suggests a resurgence of individualism in some Italian 
districts, where collective bonds are thought to be particularly strong and enduring, as 
small firms struggle to survive the onslaught of Asian competition (The Economist 
1994). Recent interview studies revealed a growing scepticism among business 
owners and service providers about the benefits of small firm networks, arguing that 
"a model centred on small and medium-sized family firms with an extensive local 
social division of labour is no longer viable. Instead, there is a need for financial 
centralization and greater vertical integration" (Dunford et al. 1993, p. 136). Whether 
the push for corporate re-integration has benign consequences for employment 
relations depends partly on the organization of labor interests. In the German case, at 
least, the territorial jurisdiction of the leading industrial unions is so broadly defined 
that diverse supplier and subcontractor relations - typical of industrial districts - can 
often be covered by a single union, without inter-union competition and 
notwithstanding the ability of works councils to strike special deals at the plant level 
(Streeck 1991). 
A third reason for being sceptical about the ability of interventionist strategies to 
replicate successful industrial districts stems from the emergent nature of districts. 
Historical accounts of contemporary districts emphasize the evolutionary 
development of institutional arrangements, but also note that evolution is not always 
uni-directional and without friction. Although it can be argued that the relative 
success of the Baden-Württemberg economy in the 1970s and 1980s was in part 
rooted in strong artisan traditions of the nineteenth century, the development of 
artisanship in that region was highly uneven and not the result of a consistent public 
policy (Sedatis 1979). In Emilia-Romagna, it has taken the small firm sector three to 
four decades to reach a stage where one can reasonably speak of economic success 
(Murray 1987). Policy initiatives to create district arrangements are likely to fail, if 
they ignore the evolutionary character of social relations. 
Finally, even if interventionist strategies were able to replicate and create 
industrial districts, political assignments of special status to places may lead to a 
"bandwagon effect", as Glasmeier (1988) demonstrated for the Japanese Technopolis 
program. Assigning special status to particular regions may create political pressure 
and lead to unproductive competition among governmental jurisdictions for limited 
resources. The end-effect would be that none or only the politically most powerful 
regions are able to attract the critical mass of resources necessary for obtaining the 
promised synergies of industrial districts. It can hardly be in the interest of labor 
                                                          
7 The growth rate of Baden-Württemberg's economic output has been below that of the rest of 
West Germany since 1990, and in 1993 the region's economy contracted more dramatically 
than any other German state, despite a continued consensus orientation (Frenkel 1994). 
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unions to support employment creation strategies that are driven by such inter-
regional competition (Adamy and Bosch 1986). 
In conclusion, how the various tensions and contradictions that have been 
identified in this paper will be resolved empirically remains an open question. As our 
analysis has shown, there is some doubt that the empirical realities of industrial 
districts support theoretical expectations. Employment opportunities are not always 
balanced, interfirm cooperation does not necessarily lead to employment and wage 
security, and the needs of endogenous local development tend to be overwhelmed by 
global competitive forces. It may well be that the pure district model, based on the 
assumption of social embedding, is sustainable only in culturally homogeneous and 
protected locales, but this would severely limit its utility as a model for economic 
renewal. In any case, there is considerable room for detailed and comparative 
research to study the limitations of the industrial district model for regional economic 
development. The challenge will be to look beyond the ideological shrouds of the 
"district fetish." 
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